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Alternatives to Google Agent Compute Engine for Sandboxing AI Agents

Card No. 06·32107 · Updated · Standard formula, shown below

If you need to sandbox AI agents but don’t want to use Google Agent Compute Engine, the main alternatives are container-based sandboxes like Docker with gVisor or Firecracker, managed sandboxing services like E2B and Modal Sandboxes, and open-source tools like Firecracker and nsjail. This article explains these options, how they compare, and how to choose the right one for your use case.

Why Sandboxing AI Agents Is Hard

AI agents are programs that can take actions—like running code, browsing the web, or interacting with APIs—often in response to natural language prompts. Because these actions can be unpredictable, you need to isolate them from your main system to prevent malicious or buggy behavior from causing damage. Sandboxing is the practice of running code in a restricted environment where it can’t access sensitive files, network resources, or other processes without permission.

The challenge with AI agents is that they often need to run arbitrary code, which could be anything from a simple Python script to a full application. This means the sandbox must be both secure (strictly limited) and flexible (able to run a wide range of programs). Traditional virtual machines (VMs) are secure but heavy; simple process isolation is fast but not secure enough for untrusted code. The alternatives below sit between these extremes.

Container-Based Sandboxes (Docker, gVisor, Firecracker)

Containers are the most common way to sandbox AI agents today. Docker is the standard container runtime, but it relies on the host kernel, which means a kernel vulnerability could break out of the container. To address this, several projects add extra isolation layers:

  • gVisor (by Google) is a user-space kernel that intercepts system calls from the container and handles them in a separate, isolated process. This means even if the container is compromised, the attacker only gets access to gVisor’s emulated kernel, not the host. It’s a solid choice for running untrusted code, though it has some performance overhead.
  • Firecracker (by AWS) is a microVM designed specifically for serverless workloads. It boots in under 125ms and uses minimal memory, making it ideal for running many short-lived sandboxes. Each microVM runs its own kernel, so isolation is strong, but you need to manage the VM lifecycle yourself.
  • Kata Containers combine the speed of containers with the security of VMs by running each container inside its own lightweight VM. It’s a good middle ground if you need strong isolation but want to keep the container workflow.

For AI agents, these container-based options are popular because they can run any code, support fast startup times, and integrate with orchestration tools like Kubernetes. However, they require you to handle the infrastructure: building images, managing networking, and cleaning up resources.

Managed Sandboxing Services (E2B, Modal, Fly.io)

If you don’t want to manage your own infrastructure, several platforms offer sandboxing as a service. These are designed specifically for AI agents and often provide SDKs that make it easy to spawn a sandbox, run code, and get results.

  • E2B is a dedicated sandboxing platform for AI agents. It runs Firecracker microVMs under the hood and gives you a simple API to create a sandbox, install packages, and execute code. It also supports filesystem snapshots, so you can save and restore state between runs.
  • Modal is a serverless platform that lets you run code in the cloud with fast cold starts. It’s not specifically for AI agents, but it’s often used for that purpose because it supports Python, has a generous free tier, and can run arbitrary code in isolated environments.
  • Fly.io offers both containers and microVMs with a global network. You can use it to run agents close to users, and it has a built-in sandboxing layer that adds isolation to containers.

These services handle scaling, security patches, and infrastructure management, so you can focus on the agent logic. The trade-off is cost—you pay per second of compute—and you’re relying on a third-party service, which might not be acceptable for sensitive data.

Open-Source and DIY Options (nsjail, bubblewrap, QEMU)

For those who want full control or need to run sandboxes on-premises, there are several open-source tools that can be assembled into a custom sandboxing solution.

  • nsjail is a Linux tool that uses namespaces, cgroups, and seccomp to isolate processes. It’s lightweight and fast, but it requires careful configuration to be secure. It’s often used in CTF competitions and for running untrusted binaries.
  • bubblewrap (from Flatpak) is a similar tool that creates unprivileged sandboxes. It’s simpler than nsjail but still requires you to set up mount namespaces and seccomp filters.
  • QEMU with KVM can run full VMs, which gives the strongest isolation but with high overhead. It’s a fallback if you need to emulate a different architecture or run an entire operating system.

Building your own sandbox with these tools is educational and gives you complete control, but it’s also risky: a misconfiguration can leave your host vulnerable. If you’re not an expert in Linux security, it’s better to use a managed service or a battle-tested container runtime.

How to Choose the Right Sandbox

The right choice depends on several factors:

  • Security requirements: If you’re running untrusted code from the internet, you need strong isolation (microVMs or gVisor). If the code is from a trusted source, basic containers might be enough.
  • Startup time: Agents that need to respond quickly benefit from Firecracker (fast boot) or container-based solutions that can reuse warm pools.
  • Resource usage: MicroVMs use more memory than containers, but they’re more secure. If you’re running thousands of agents, consider the overhead.
  • Ease of use: Managed services like E2B or Modal are the easiest to integrate, but they cost money. DIY options are free but require significant engineering effort.
  • Compliance: If you need to keep data on-premises, you’ll likely choose open-source tools or a private cloud deployment of a service like Firecracker.

A common approach is to start with a managed service for prototyping, then migrate to a self-hosted solution once you understand your workload patterns.

Cost and Performance Considerations

Sandboxing adds overhead, and the cost can be significant at scale. Here are some numbers to keep in mind:

  • Firecracker microVMs typically use about 5-10 MB of memory each, plus the guest kernel. A 1 GB VM can run thousands of instances on a single host.
  • gVisor adds a 20-50% CPU overhead for system-call-heavy workloads, but it’s negligible for I/O-bound or CPU-bound tasks.
  • Managed services charge by the second of compute, often around $0.000002 per second per GB of memory (but this varies). For a typical agent that runs for 10 seconds, that’s a fraction of a cent.

To reduce costs, you can reuse sandboxes for multiple requests (if your agent is stateless), use pre-built images to avoid package installation, and shut down idle sandboxes quickly.

Security Best Practices

No sandbox is perfect. Here are some practices to follow:

  • Always run sandboxes with the least privilege needed. Don’t give them root access unless necessary.
  • Limit network access—many agents don’t need internet, so block it at the firewall level.
  • Set resource limits (CPU, memory, disk) to prevent a runaway agent from exhausting your host.
  • Use seccomp filters to block dangerous system calls, even in containers.
  • Regularly update your sandbox runtime to patch known vulnerabilities.

Remember that sandboxing is about reducing risk, not eliminating it. For highly sensitive operations, consider running agents in a separate network segment or even on a separate physical machine.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is Docker alone enough to sandbox AI agents?

Docker containers provide isolation, but they share the host kernel, so a kernel vulnerability could allow an attacker to escape. For untrusted code, it’s safer to use a hardened runtime like gVisor or a microVM. Docker is fine for trusted code or for development, but not for security-critical production use.

What’s the difference between gVisor and Firecracker?

gVisor is a user-space kernel that intercepts system calls from a container, while Firecracker is a microVM that runs a full guest kernel. Firecracker provides stronger isolation because it has its own kernel, but it has higher startup overhead (though still under 125ms). gVisor is faster to start and uses less memory, but it’s a bit less isolated.

Can I use AWS Lambda or Azure Functions as a sandbox?

Yes, serverless functions like AWS Lambda or Azure Functions are a form of sandboxing, but they have limitations: they have a maximum execution time (often 15 minutes), limited memory, and you can’t install arbitrary packages easily. For simple agents, they can work, but for complex ones, a dedicated sandboxing service is better.

How do I handle stateful agents in a sandbox?

Most sandboxes are ephemeral, meaning they’re destroyed after the task. To maintain state, you can either persist data to an external database, or use a service that supports snapshotting (like E2B’s filesystem snapshots). You can also keep a warm pool of sandboxes with pre-loaded state.

Are there any free alternatives?

Yes, you can use open-source tools like Firecracker or nsjail on your own hardware for free, but you’ll pay for the infrastructure and maintenance. Some managed services offer free tiers, like Modal’s $30/month free credit, but they have usage limits. For hobby projects, running a single VM with Docker and gVisor is a cost-effective option.

What should I do if my agent needs to access the internet?

You can allow network access in the sandbox, but you should restrict it to specific domains or IPs using a firewall or proxy. Some managed services let you configure network policies. If your agent only needs to access a few APIs, whitelist those endpoints to reduce the attack surface.

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