Is Electronic Voting Safe? Facts & Risks

Electronic voting can be safe when properly implemented, but its security depends heavily on the specific system, its auditing capabilities, and the procedures around it. No voting method is 100% secure, and e-voting introduces unique risks that paper-based systems do not have. This article explains how electronic voting works, where its vulnerabilities lie, and what safeguards make it more or less trustworthy.

Formula

The calculator above computes the discrepancy rate between an electronic voting system’s reported results and a manual recount of a sample of ballots. The formula is:

Discrepancy Rate (%) = (Discrepancies Found / Total Ballots Audited) × 100

• Total ballots cast – the number of ballots in the audit sample or the entire election, depending on what you are measuring.
• Discrepancies found – ballots where the electronic result differs from the manual count.
• Discrepancy rate – the percentage of ballots that were recorded or counted incorrectly.

This is a simple quality metric. In real elections, auditors use statistical sampling to estimate the accuracy of the whole system from a small subset of ballots.

Worked Example

Using the default values: 1,000 total ballots audited and 5 discrepancies found.

1. Divide discrepancies by total: 5 ÷ 1000 = 0.005
2. Multiply by 100 to get a percentage: 0.005 × 100 = 0.5%

The discrepancy rate is 0.5%, meaning 99.5% of audited ballots matched the electronic record. The estimated number of accurate ballots is 995 out of 1,000.

Background: How Electronic Voting Became Widespread

Electronic voting machines have been used in the United States since the 1980s, but they became widespread after the Help America Vote Act of 2002, which provided federal funding to replace punch-card and lever machines following the 2000 Florida recount controversy. Today, most U.S. voters use either optical scan systems (where voters mark paper ballots that are then scanned) or direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines (where voters make selections on a touchscreen and the machine stores the vote electronically). Other countries, such as Brazil and India, use their own large-scale electronic systems. The shift was driven by promises of faster counts, fewer spoiled ballots, and easier accessibility for voters with disabilities.

How Electronic Voting Works

There are two main types of electronic voting systems in use today:

• Optical scan – voters fill out a paper ballot, which is then read by a scanner. The paper is the official record; the scanner just tallies it. This is widely considered the most secure electronic method because the paper can be recounted.
• Direct-recording electronic (DRE) – voters use a touchscreen, and the machine stores the vote in memory. There is no paper record unless the machine has a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) printer attached.

In both cases, results are transmitted from precinct machines to a central tabulator, either by removable memory cards, modem, or over a network. The transmission step is a key vulnerability point. Modern systems often include encryption and require multiple authentication factors, but older machines may lack these protections.

Common Problems and Vulnerabilities

Security researchers have repeatedly demonstrated weaknesses in electronic voting systems. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security confirmed that Russian hackers had probed election systems in at least 21 states, though there was no evidence that votes were changed. More recently, a 2023 study by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology found that a voting machine used in several states could be hacked in under an hour using commercially available parts. Specific vulnerabilities include:

• Software bugs – miscounting votes or crashing on election day.
• Malware – could be installed via infected memory cards or USB drives used to update machines.
• Network attacks – if machines are connected to the internet, they can be remotely accessed.
• Insider threats – election officials or technicians with access could tamper with the system.
• Lack of paper trail – DRE machines without VVPAT cannot be independently audited.

The most critical issue is that many older DRE machines have no paper record at all. If a machine is hacked or malfunctions, there is no way to know what the voter actually intended.

Safety Measures That Make E-Voting More Secure

Security experts generally agree that electronic voting can be made acceptably safe if the following measures are in place:

• Voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT) – every electronic vote also prints a paper record that the voter can see and confirm. The paper is the official ballot for recounts.
• Post-election risk-limiting audits (RLAs) – after the election, a random sample of paper ballots is manually counted and compared to the electronic results. If the discrepancy is too large, a full recount is triggered.
• No internet connectivity – voting machines should be air-gapped, meaning they are not connected to the internet or any network during voting or counting.
• Physical security – machines are sealed, stored in locked rooms, and monitored by cameras or observers from multiple parties.
• Logic and accuracy testing – before each election, machines are tested with a known set of votes to ensure they count correctly.
• Certification and transparency – voting software should be open to inspection by independent experts, and the source code should be publicly available for review.

When these measures are implemented, electronic voting is generally considered safe. The risk is not the technology itself, but whether jurisdictions choose to implement these safeguards.

Comparison: Electronic vs. Paper Voting

Paper ballots (hand-counted or optical scan) are often described as the gold standard for security because they are tangible, auditable, and do not depend on software. However, paper systems have their own problems: human error in counting, lost ballots, and slower results. Electronic voting offers speed, accuracy in counting, and accessibility, but introduces cyber risks. The key difference is that paper creates a permanent, physical record that can be verified, while electronic-only systems rely on the integrity of software and hardware.

Many security experts advocate for a hybrid approach: use optical scan machines for most voters, and DRE with VVPAT for voters with disabilities who cannot use paper ballots. This combines the speed of electronic counting with the security of a paper trail.

Costs and Practical Considerations

Electronic voting machines are expensive. A single DRE machine can cost between $5,000 and $10,000, and jurisdictions need one for every precinct. Maintenance, software updates, and staff training add ongoing costs. Paper-based optical scan systems are generally cheaper, but they require a steady supply of paper ballots and more physical storage space. The cost of replacing aging machines is a major reason many jurisdictions still use outdated equipment. For example, in 2020, many U.S. counties were still using machines purchased in the early 2000s, some of which had known security flaws.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can electronic voting machines be hacked?

Yes, researchers have demonstrated that many commercial voting machines can be hacked, sometimes in minutes. However, hacking a single machine does not necessarily change an election outcome. A successful attack would require access to many machines, bypassing physical security, and avoiding detection. That is why risk-limiting audits are so important – they catch any tampering after the fact.

Is internet voting safe?

No, internet voting is widely considered unsafe by security experts. Voting over the internet cannot be fully secured because malware on the voter’s device, phishing attacks, and denial-of-service attacks can all compromise the vote. Even the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) advises against internet voting for federal elections. Some states allow online voting for military and overseas voters, but it is always a risk trade-off.

What is a risk-limiting audit?

A risk-limiting audit (RLA) is a post-election check where a random sample of paper ballots is manually counted and compared to the electronic results. If the discrepancy is small, the audit confirms the outcome. If it is large, the audit expands to a full recount. RLAs provide strong statistical evidence that the reported winner actually won.

Do electronic voting machines have a paper trail?

It depends on the machine. Optical scan machines always produce a paper ballot. DRE machines may or may not have a voter-verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT). Many older DRE machines have no paper record, which makes them impossible to audit. Newer machines typically include VVPAT, but not all jurisdictions have replaced their old equipment.

Why do some countries use electronic voting and others do not?

Countries make different choices based on their electoral traditions, trust in government, and resources. For example, Brazil has used electronic voting since 1996 and has no paper trail, arguing that it reduces fraud and speeds results. Germany’s constitutional court banned electronic voting in 2009 because it could not be verified by the public. The Netherlands abandoned e-voting in 2007 after security researchers demonstrated vulnerabilities. There is no global consensus.

What can voters do to ensure their vote is counted?

Voters can verify that their ballot is correct before submitting it, especially if they use a DRE machine with VVPAT – check that the printed paper matches your selections. After the election, you can check your state’s voter portal to confirm your ballot was received and counted. You can also advocate for your jurisdiction to use paper ballots and conduct risk-limiting audits.

Alternatives and the Future

Given the security concerns, some jurisdictions are moving away from electronic voting entirely. In 2020, the U.S. state of Georgia replaced its DRE machines with new ones that include a paper ballot and a touchscreen marking device. Other states have adopted hand-marked paper ballots as the standard. The future likely involves more hybrid systems: electronic marking for accessibility, paper as the official record, and robust audits to verify results. While electronic voting is not inherently unsafe, its safety depends on transparency, testing, and the ability to audit the outcome independently.

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in t | Total ballots cast | - | 1000 | 1 | 100000000
in d | Discrepancies found in audit | - | 5 | 0 | 100000000
out rate | Discrepancy rate | % | (d / t) * 100 | 3
out ok | Estimated accurate ballots | - | t - d | 0